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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern societies cannot function without information and communications
technology (ICT) systems. When ICT systems such as electronic government
(e-government) systems, e-payment infrastructures, and mobile phone networks fail,
users can still access alternative systems based on older technologies, but these alter-
natives are rapidly disappearing. E-government services are introduced on the Web
to improve services to citizens and to free up the human resources needed to tackle
the increasing health care requirements of aging populations. Since there will not
be enough government employees to handle a large number of requests over the
phone, on paper, or by personal appointment in the future, it is necessary to deploy
e-government services that remain robust to undesirable incidents over time and that
are available to citizens around the clock.
The robustness and availability of national e-payment infrastructures are also
becoming increasingly important as countries are becoming cashless societies. If a
nationwide e-payment infrastructure goes down in a cash-free society, people will
not be able to pay for necessities. In Scandinavia, this is already more or less the
case, since many people, especially the young, no longer carry cash. While Norwe-
gian banks want to abolish cash altogether to reduce costs, there have been enough
incidents over the last ten years causing unplanned downtime and erroneous account
withdrawals to question whether the current e-payment infrastructure can provide the
very high availability and long-term robustness required by a completely cash-free
society.
Mobile phone networks have nearly replaced fixed-line phone systems in many
countries. It is difficult to find spare parts for the old landline systems and they
are expensive to maintain. Norway’s largest telecom company wants all remaining
fixed-phone subscribers to move to mobile subscription plans so it can dismantle the
landline system altogether. Several large incidents have demonstrated how dependent
the Norwegian population has become on mobile phone networks. When areas on
the west coast of Norway lost power for several days because of a severe storm,
the local inhabitants mainly complained about the mobile phone networks being
down, illustrating that people now expect their mobile phones to work anytime and
anywhere.
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As traditional governmental services, cash-based payment systems, and landline
phone networks are disappearing, there is a growing need for very large ICT systems
with very high availability and sustained robustness to unwanted incidents. How
should such systems be designed and operated to meet the increasing expectations of
users in a rapidly changing world? Is a particular system design fragilizing a service of
importance to millions of users? Will users be exposed to incidents with intolerable
impact? Common mode failure is a particularly important challenge, defined as a
failure in multiple parts of a system due to a single event. How do we prevent single
events from propagating and taking down many parts in the same manner? This
book tries to answer these questions by modeling large ICT systems as complex
adaptive systems.
1.1 Complex Adaptive Systems
The term complex adaptive system denotes a man-made or natural system consisting
of many entities that interact in involved ways. The entities adapt to each other and
the environment to enable the system as a whole to survive events with potentially
large negative impact [1–7]. ICT systems consisting of large networked computer
systems and many stakeholders, including users, operators, and owners, are complex
adaptive systems, as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. The complexity is due primarily to the
numerous interactions between the stakeholders and the computer systems, the large
amounts of communications between the networked subsystems, and the influence of
changing security and privacy policies, as well as threats such as equipment failure,
extreme weather, and sabotage. Collections of software services running on cloud
computing platforms and nationwide infrastructures for mobile telecom constitute
two particularly interesting classes of complex adaptive ICT systems with many
users, mutually dependent entities, and self-regulating behaviors.
To gain an understanding of why governments and companies build complex
adaptive ICT systems, we consider how valuable distributed ICT systems are to their
Fig. 1.1 A complex ICT system’s global behavior is caused by dynamic interactions between the
stakeholders and the networked computer system and by interactions between the network’s many
subsystems. Changes to policies, threats, or subsystems can cause sudden and large changes in
global behavior
1.1 Complex Adaptive Systems 5
owners. Here, value can be the ability to provide a population with transactional
services on the Web or the revenue from an online social network. Consider a sys-
tem with N users. The number of possible pairs of connections between users is
N (N − 1)/2, giving rise to Metcalfe’s law, stating that the value of a system is pro-
portional to the square of the number of connected users, N 2. Alternatively, there
are 2N − N − 1 possible sub-groups of users, resulting in Reed’s law, stating that
the value of a system scales exponentially with the number of users, 2N . Both laws
indicate that the value of distributed ICT systems grows very rapidly with the num-
ber of users, making it desirable for governments and companies to build huge ICT
systems of high complexity. In addition, for many networked systems, every new
user makes a system’s services more valuable to the other users.
Complex adaptive systems contain feedback loops, as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. A
feedback loop is a series of interacting processes that together result in a system
adapting to the effect of its previous behavior. Feedback loops are what make complex
systems adaptive. The loops create emergent global patterns or behaviors. Positive
(escalating or compounding) feedback loops propagate and turn local events into
global events, affecting whole systems, while negative (dampening or stabilizing)
feedback loops limit the impact of local events affecting parts of systems. Negative
feedback typically stabilizes a system’s global behavior over a certain operating
range, while positive feedback creates extreme global behavior outside the normal
operating range [1, 3, 4]. Ideally, complex adaptive ICT systems should prevent
positive feedback loops from ever propagating local failures into extreme global
behaviors and causing systemic failures.
The emergent global behaviors of complex adaptive ICT systems are often mod-
eled as stochastic events with given probability distributions. We distinguish between
thin-tailed and thick-tailed distributions (see Chap. 2). If the tails are thin, then out-
liers in the form of extreme global behaviors can be ignored because the thin tails
make the outliers very unlikely. When the distributions have thick tails, the outliers
cannot be ignored because the probability that at least one outlier will occur is sig-
nificant. Many man-made systems, including ICT systems, have positive feedback
loops that cause certain local events to propagate and create extreme global behaviors.
The extreme behaviors, especially unplanned downtime, become more common than
stakeholders can accept. These outliers are modeled by probability distributions with
thick tails. Unfortunately, classical methods for risk analysis based on predictions of
Fig. 1.2 Generic feedback loop: an external or internal action leads to a system reaction. The
reaction then causes the system to change, which initiates another action and the process repeats
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Fig. 1.3 Birth–death process illustrating malware spreading
future events tend to underestimate or ignore extreme global behaviors in complex
adaptive ICT systems, even though these events may very well dominate the overall
risk to stakeholders.
A vulnerability in a man-made system can be a flaw in the design, a bug in the
implementation, or a mistake in the system’s operation or management. Any complex
man-made system has vulnerabilities. Coincidental errors and malfunctions, as well
as hostile and targeted attacks, exploit vulnerabilities to cause failures leading to
extreme global behavior such as unplanned system downtime. In particular, malicious
software, or malware, can exploit vulnerabilities and cause information leakage.
Figure 1.3 depicts a simple model of an infectious malware epidemic that involves a
positive feedback loop of increased births and a negative loop of increased deaths.
Without deaths, the population size will increase exponentially, that is, negative
feedback is needed to keep the positive feedback under control [1].
The observed fragility of complex ICT systems to prolonged downtime and mal-
ware infections demonstrates the need for better system design, implementation,
operation, and management. The many interactions between the adaptive entities in
the systems create a highly non-linear and time-varying relation between the input
and output that makes it nearly impossible to predict extreme global behavior. Hence,
we need non-predictable techniques to create complex adaptive ICT systems. Taleb’s
work [8–12] suggests that we should develop and operate so-called anti-fragile sys-
tems characterized by two important properties: First, an anti-fragile ICT system fails
early with a small, local impact to break positive feedback loops before they can cre-
ate extreme global behaviors. Second, the prevention of extreme global behaviors
allows stakeholders to learn from small-impact incidents about new vulnerabilities
caused by changes in the system and its environment. The vulnerabilities can then
be mitigated to avoid future extreme behaviors.
This book investigates how to develop and operate anti-fragile ICT systems.
Cloud-based systems are emphasized because cloud computing platforms utilizing
virtualization technologies greatly facilitate the creation and maintenance of anti-
fragility compared to traditional datacenters without virtualization technologies (see
Chap. 5).
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Fig. 1.4 Toward anti-fragility
1.2 Fragile, Robust, and Anti-fragile Systems
The research literature has long categorized complex adaptive systems as fragile or
robust to incidents with a particular type of impact. Fragile systems are vulnerable
to the impacts of these incidents, while robust systems withstand or absorb them.
Unlike robust systems, anti-fragile systems learn from such incidents how to function
increasingly well in a changing environment [9, 10]. In fact, anti-fragile systems
need incidents to remain well adapted to their environments. Without the ability to
learn from incidents, anti-fragile systems become fragile over time as the systems
themselves and their environments change. The human immune system, with its
ability to adapt and self-repair, is a prime example of a system that is anti-fragile to
many types of impact.
As depicted in Fig. 1.4, the fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility to a particular
type of impact are best viewed as degrees on a spectrum with fragile systems to
the left, robust systems in the middle, and anti-fragile systems to the right. Systems
have to become robust before they can become anti-fragile and no system can be
anti-fragile to all possible types of impact [10]. At present, there is no general tech-
nique to measure fragility, robustness, and anti-fragility. However, this book will
demonstrate that it is not difficult to recognize when a system is fragile, for exam-
ple, to downtime or malware spreading. Furthermore, it will introduce design and
operational principles that move toward anti-fragility in Fig. 1.4.
1.3 Overview of Book
Taleb [10] introduced the concept of anti-fragility to analyze and explain why it is not
enough for large natural or man-made systems to be robust to predictable events with
large impact. In an unpredictable world, systems must be able to handle randomness,
volatility, and unforeseen large-impact events. Learning from incidents is needed to
prevent systems from developing fragilities over time.
So far there are no general methods or theories on how to develop or operate anti-
fragile ICT systems. This book studies select philosophical and practical aspects of
anti-fragile ICT systems to gain an initial understanding of them. The main mes-
sage is that we should stop building fragile ICT systems of national or international
importance and start building anti-fragile ICT systems.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of anti-fragility,
why the concept is important, and how to achieve anti-fragility in general. Part II
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outlines in some detail how different ICT systems can achieve anti-fragility to down-
time and Part III develops a technique to achieve anti-fragility to malware spreading.
Since we need to detect failures to achieve anti-fragility, Part IV discusses how to
detect anomalies in system behavior. Finally, Part V summarizes the book’s main
insights and suggests potential venues for further work.
The contents of Parts I and II should be easy to understand for most readers, while
an additional effort may be needed to understand the more complicated content of
Parts III and IV. To facilitate understanding, certain chapters repeat central informa-
tion introduced earlier in the book. The following sections provide more detailed
summaries of the five parts.
1.4 Creating and Maintaining Anti-fragility
Part I, including the current chapter, outlines how to create and operate complex adap-
tive ICT systems with anti-fragility to different types of impact, such as unplanned
downtime and malware spreading. Chapter 2 first discusses rare events with a large
negative impact and argues that it is, at best, very hard to predict all such events
in complex systems. Next, it explains why a system must limit the impact of these
events to gain robustness and why learning from the remaining events with a small
impact is necessary to achieve anti-fragility.
While organizations with anti-fragile systems must accept and learn from failures,
they also need to focus on building trust with users to maintain and increase their user
base. Chapter 3 defines a simple agent-based model of how trust changes in a user
population. The model illustrates that trust is fragile to incidents directly affecting
few users and that massive distrust is robust to large efforts to regain trust. Since
it is very hard to predict which events have the potential to create massive distrust,
organizations must have procedures in place to handle the impact of incidents before
distrust starts to spread.
The design of an ICT system is the process of defining its components, interfaces,
data formats, data flow, and data storage that together satisfy specified availabil-
ity, performance, and scalability requirements. Chapter 4 first provides four design
principles that isolate local failures, keeping their impacts small, while supporting
stringent requirements. Second, it introduces one operational principle that enables
stakeholders to quickly learn from natural and induced failures to maintain a level
of anti-fragility as a system and its environment change. While each principle alone
does not provide any new fundamental insight, collectively the five principles outline
a novel way to design and operate anti-fragile ICT systems. In particular, it is possi-
ble to create ICT systems with higher availability than today’s tightly connected and
highly optimized systems with limited redundancy and diversity.
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1.5 Anti-fragility to Downtime
A cloud computing platform enables ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources such as CPUs, networks, memory,
and databases that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interaction [13, 14]. Virtualization technologies are
used to abstract the resources for applications and end users. The availability of a
cloud-based ICT system is measured by the percentage of time it is accessible to
users. A high availability of 99.99 %, referred to as four nines of availability, corre-
sponds to about 53 min of downtime each year. A complex ICT system is fragile to
downtime if its availability is unacceptably low to some stakeholders, robust if the
availability is acceptable to all stakeholders, and anti-fragile if stakeholders or the
technical system itself learn to maintain an acceptable availability as the system and
its environment change.
Part II discusses how the five design and operational principles from Chap. 4 can
be implemented on cloud computing platforms to create highly available software
solutions and mobile telecom infrastructures. To gain insight, we reason about real
systems using philosophical concepts, objects, figures, and impressions of past inci-
dents. The thinking is based solely on publicly available information and is rooted in
complexity science [15–20], where whole systems cannot be understood by exclu-
sively studying their parts; instead, it is necessary to emphasize interrelationships
and changes to understand the systems’ dynamic global behaviors.
Chapter 5 outlines how Netflix implemented the five principles in their cloud-
based web-scale solution for media streaming. Chapter 6 explains why Norway’s
e-government system has experienced too much downtime and describes how a
new cloud-based system founded on the five principles can achieve anti-fragility to
downtime. The chapter also references the UK e-government system to argue the
need for user-focused and iterative software development to achieve anti-fragility.
Finally, Chap. 7 discusses fragility to downtime in Norwegian telecom systems and
outlines how the five principles applied on cloud computing platforms can make
telecom systems anti-fragile to downtime.
1.6 Anti-fragility to Malware Spreading
Malware is any form of malicious software used to disrupt computer operations,
gather sensitive information, or gain unauthorized access to private computer sys-
tems. Malware appears as executable code, scripts, active content, and other software.
Malware includes computer viruses, worms, trojans, ransomware, spyware, scare-
ware, and other types of malicious programs. Worldwide, trojans, worms, and viruses
continue to dominate among the many malware types.
Malware is a serious threat to anybody using a computer system connected to the
Internet [21, 22]. A networked system is fragile to malware spreading when local
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outbreaks spread far and robust when new malware outbreaks have very limited
spreading. The system is anti-fragile to malware spreading if it first learns to reduce
the fraction of infected devices, for example, to less than 1 % and then manages to
keep the fraction of infected devices low even as the spreading mechanism of the
malware changes.
Part III develops a novel malware-halting technique that prevents frequent mal-
ware outbreaks from propagating over huge networks of computing devices. Calcula-
tions and simulations using slightly modified epidemiological models from network
science [23] determine the time-averaged fraction of infected devices. Chapter 8 out-
lines how application stores utilizing compilers with so-called diversity engines [24]
can generate enough software diversity to gain robustness to malware spreading by
halting frequent malware outbreaks with a fixed spreading mechanism. It also argues
that diversity slows down persistent targeted attacks.
Chapter 9 studies malware types that spread over networks with an unknown
topology. The malware studied have the ability to reinfect nodes multiple times.
Acquaintance immunization [25] and software diversity are combined to gain robust-
ness to malware reinfections. While reinfections generally help malware stay alive
for a long time, the described halting technique prevents malware outbreaks from
spreading very far before they die out.
Chapter 10 combines cloud computing, time-varying software diversity, immu-
nization, and imperfect malware detection/removal to model and analyze networks
that gain anti-fragility to malware spreading by learning to halt and remove malware
with unknown and time-varying spreading mechanisms. Non-infectious malware
mistakenly downloaded by computer users are viewed as infectious malware with
limited spreading ability.
1.7 Anomaly Detection
To achieve anti-fragility to a particular type of intolerable impact, local failures
must be detected before they can propagate into systemic failures. Humans are often
needed to determine whether a local anomaly is just a benign change or a local failure
with the potential to create a systemic failure. Current ICT systems deploy various
techniques and heuristics to detect anomalies. For example, banks and credit card
companies have a rich set of heuristics to detect fraud [26].
In Part IV, we study a general learning algorithm based on the biology of the brain’s
neocortex. The learning algorithm was developed by Hawkins [27] and implemented
in software by the company Numenta (http://numenta.com). The algorithm is able
to predict the behavior of a wide variety of systems. If a prediction and the actual
behavior differ, then an anomaly is detected. Chapter 11 discusses the biological basis
for the learning algorithm and provides an overview of the algorithm itself.
Numenta’s experiments with different types of streaming data, including metric
data from cloud applications, show that the algorithm detects anomalies that are
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hard for humans to discover. Chapter 12 illustrates how the early detection of subtle
anomalies allows systems or their stakeholders to take early action to prevent local
failures from creating intolerable impact.
1.8 Ongoing Explanatory Work
Part V consists of Chap. 13. It summarizes the book’s main insights and discusses
possible research directions to further increase the understanding of anti-fragile ICT
systems.
Overall, this book is a result of the author’s ongoing long-term effort to under-
stand what Taleb’s [8–12] philosophical investigations and Geer’s [28–33] systems
thinking tell us about the design, implementation, operation, and management of
complex adaptive ICT systems. Both Geer and Taleb look to nature to understand
anti-fragile systems. In nature, sexual reproduction creates many species consisting
of individuals who genetically differ from each other. An infectious disease is very
unlikely to wipe out an entire population, since some individuals are almost certainly
genetically immune. In other words, while each individual is vulnerable to diseases,
the population survives due to a diverse gene pool.
While the author avoids superficial references to biology and Darwin’s theory of
evolution in the book, he agrees with Geer and Taleb that there is much to learn from
nature on how to build complex ICT systems. In particular, Geer has stated several
times that computing devices should have a relatively short life unless they are easy
to upgrade. This observation has strongly influenced the work in Part III, leading to
a novel approach to malware halting.
It is hard to precisely model the global behaviors of complex ICT systems. Rather
than trying to develop sophisticated models to accurately simulate the behaviors of
real systems, this book develops toy models to gain an understanding of them. While
these models cannot predict the global behavior of real systems, they provide expla-
nations of important system properties. The suggested malware-halting technique
in Part III demonstrates that it is possible to create novel approaches and solutions
to difficult problems by developing simple agent-based models of networked ICT
systems and then employing techniques from network science to analyze the models’
properties.
Since many of the ideas presented in this book have yet to be tested in real systems
and since the book by no means covers all aspects of anti-fragile ICT systems,
the author welcomes criticism and debate to shed further light on how to develop
and operate anti-fragile ICT systems. Understanding all aspects of these systems is
an important task for both the research community and the industry—not only for
the author.
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